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Morember 5, 1962

SUBJECT: Sarrisale to Interference with erial Arryvillance

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The florists have flatly said that all extiniveraft weapons were in Ouban hands (New York 1851 of October 31; Euspetsey to McCloy). If it became mecessary to undertake military estion against Cuben air defenses as a result of their interference in our reconneissance, we could make public the fact that the Soviets had informed us that such weapons were all in Guben hands. This would reduce the already very remote possibility that the Sevieta would react in any serious way to such actions on our part in reprisel.

Soviet military advisors and technicians were present with the Reyptian forces at the time of the Bues invasion in October 1956. We do not know whether any were killed in the Angle-French strafing and bombing, but in any case the Soviets made no protest whatecover. They did quietly evacuate their technicians through the Suiga as soon as that was practicable.

While it would be underirable to undertake unnecessary military action endangering Soviet personnel, it would be even more undesirable to give then the impression that our resolve was so weak that we would permit Americans to be killed in conducting operations which even the Seriets here passively recognized must now ecour. Finally, as noted above, the Soviete here extinctively (whether extractly or not) washed their hands of Pahon air defease weepens.

The best course of artisa would probably be to eliminate interforing missile or gam sites or aircraft if possible, or comparable veapous on a regrisal basis.

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
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MEMORARDUM

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Earrisels to Interference with US <u> Lerial Burreillance</u>

Unless we make arretal elear to the Soviets and to the Cabana that we will brook no interference with our unilateral serial inspection, we will undersine any credence in our insistence on longer-range inspection in addition to making exceptionally difficult our own interin unlisteral effort. If we are not prepared to take forceful steps to counter the use of force against ourselves, we will rightly or wrongly (and either would be bad) undermine belief that we would ever resort to force to most intransiguence on all the unresolved issues concerning present and future verification arrangements.



Soviet military advisors and technicians were present with the Egyptian forces at the time of the Suez invasion in October 1956. We do not know whether any were killed in the anglo-French strafing and bombing, but in any case the Soviets made no protest whatsoever. They did quietly evacuate their technicians through the Sudan as soon as that was practicable.

While it would be undesirable to undertake unnecessary military action endangering Soviet personnel, it would be even more undesirable to give them the impression that our resolve was so weak that we would permit Americans to be killed in conducting operations which even the Soviete have pessively recognized must now occur.

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## TOP SECRET COVER SHEET

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4. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT(6) (Origin, subject, reference no. or Z COPY INFORMATION WITTER COPY JUFORMATION COPY. Memo dtd 11-5-62 re Reprisals to Interference US Aerial Surveillance TELEGRAMS, DESPATCHES, ETC. CHPY NO. 3 OF 10 CHPIES S. FORWARDED 3. DATE AND NAME OF PERSON PREPARING FORM 11-5-62 Rose-Perruso non excinct 11-5-62 Shirley Cowgar (Top Socret Control Officer) (Date) grieffe en en eng sende ar Beitati de linde mennacht eine er borele 10.12 PERSONS TO WHOM MOUTED DO OFFICE BIGHATURES THE TO HE TO MATE RECEIVED IT THE BATE READ BATE RELEASES SYNDOL. READING DOCUMENT Mr. Ball - 1965 8 right größige farricht des gerätzereitst, erziellich fregeliegenar und ibene T. A. then any part of the docerest than the fact that are the ñ. 25 22 43 ting you about the committee out they are a continued of a notice of the +227 91 symptom wil al becomes, andomais, core अग्राजा के के किया का के किया का किया के किया क man trade contact to the contract of the contract of O housed provide and reliable and the same gifting massi maiy with actions of the commen ที่ ก็สากระบา ्रापु १६ ज्या विकास के विकास । ४५ (१५) १५ (१५) १५ (१५) १५ (१५) : =--

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY
G/PM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DATE 4/1/8

PORTIONS DENIED AS INDICATED

November 5, 1962

## MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Reprisals to Interference with US
Aerial Surveillance

Unless we make crystal clear to the Soviets and to the Cubans that we will brook no interference with our unilateral aerial inspection, we will undermine any credence in our insistence on longer-range inspection in addition to making exceptionally difficult our own interim unilateral effort. If we are not prepared to take forceful steps to counter the use of force against ourselves, we will rightly or wrongly (and either would be bad lundermine belief that we would ever resort to force to meet intransigeance on all the unresolved issues concerning present and future verification arrangements.

The Soviets have flatly said that all antiaircraft weapons were in Cuban hands

If it became necessary to undertake military action against Cuban air defenses as a result of their interference in our reconnaissance, we could make public the fact that the Soviets had informed us that such weapons were all in Cuban hands. This would reduce the already very remote possibility that the Soviets would react in any serious way to such actions on our part in reprisal.

Soviet military advisors and technicians were present with the Egyptian forces at the time of the Suez invasion in October 1956. We do not know whether any were killed in the Anglo-French strafing and bombing, but in any case the Soviets made no protest whatsoever. They did quietly evacuate their technicians through the Sudan as soon as that was practicable.

While it would be undesirable to undertake unnecessary military action endangering Soviet personnel, it would be even more undesirable to give them the impression that our resolve was so weak that we would permit Americans to be killed in conducting operations which even the Soviets have passively recognized must now occur. Finally, as noted above, the Soviets have authoritatively (whether correctly or--more likely--not) washed their hands of Cuban air defense weapons.

The best course of action would probably be to eliminate the interfering missile or gun sites or aircraft if possible, or comparable weapons on a reprisal basis.

G/PM: RLGarthoff:pep

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EB